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– “At the epicenter of the economic downturn is the housing crisis, and at the 
epicenter of the housing crisis the foreclosure crisis.” – Senator Christopher J. 
Dodd, Connecticut: National Public Radio interview, March 26, 2008 
– “…. These are economic earthquakes of crisis proportions, and invisible in the 
foreclosure crisis are the people – homeowners and renters – who are becoming 
homeless.” –  Bob Erlenbusch, President, National Coalition for the Homeless
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Introduction 
The foreclosure crisis – fueled by the subprime loan meltdown – is increasingly well-
documented.  Nationally, more than two million foreclosures were reported in 2007. Nearly 
the same number is projected for 2008-2009. [See Appendices 1 (2007) and 2 (2008-09)]. 
The resulting downward spiral has reduced home prices in some areas by nearly twenty 
percent. In turn, this has the sent the local city and county revenues based on local 
property taxes into freefall.
Nearly forgotten in this crisis are the thousands of homeowners and renters who have 
become homeless once their equity is exhausted. Having no other financial resources, 
they are moving in with relatives or friends, are turning up in local emergency shelters or 
have actually found themselves on the streets.  Equally disturbing is that when local 
revenues plummet, the first budget cuts are typically to health, mental health and 
emergency programs. Often these are the very programs those who become homeless 
will need to survive. 
The National Coalition of the Homeless [NCH] is increasingly alarmed that neither state 
legislatures nor Congress are considering homeless prevention initiatives to address the 
foreclosure crisis. Instead, the focus appears to be bailing out banks, lenders and other 
financial institutions in an attempt to hold back the tsunami of economic recession.  NCH 
hopes this report will sound an alarm and inspire policymakers to take proactive measures 
that prevent more Americans from falling from foreclosure to homelessness.   
Figure 1: the Increase in Foreclosure Filings 
CNN.com/US Foreclosures up 75% By Les Christie, CNNMoney.com Staff Writer, 1-29-08 
U.S. foreclosures by state, 2007 
U.S. foreclosure filings increased 75 percent from 2006 to 2007. The 2007 total also 
represents a 149 percent increase from 2005.  
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More than
2,000,000
foreclosures took 
place in 2007. At 
least as many are 
projected for
2008 and 2009.
Executive Summary 
National news is consumed with legislative fixes for banks and mortgage companies, but 
the National Coalition for the Homeless [NCH] is compelled to highlight the invisible
victims of this crisis – the individuals and families, homeowners and renters – who now 
find themselves homeless  in urban and in rural communities across the nation. To 
document this growing trend, the NCH conducted a national e-mail survey of local and 
state homeless coalitions in late 2007 and early 2008. The primary question was, “Is your 
community seeing an increase in homelessness due to the foreclosure crisis?” 
Foreclosure to Homelessness: the Forgotten Victims of the 
Subprime Crisis summarizes the findings of that survey. Some of 
the most salient findings follow.
ᅛ Nearly 61 percent of respondents had seen an increase in 
homelessness since the foreclosure crisis began in 2007, 
with only 5 percent indicating that they had not seen an 
increase. Nearly a third did not know.
ᅛ Seventy-two percent of respondents [83 out of 115] provided 
multiple responses to the question, “How do you know there 
has been an increase?”  More than half [56.6 percent] 
indicated the source of their information was local media. 
Nearly as many had received their information via reports 
from local emergency shelters [55.4 percent] and/or clients 
[54.2 percent], while 38.6 percent indicated that their 
information came from the national media. Just one in four [25.3 percent] cited a 
government report. 
ᅛ The vast majority of respondents [88 percent] offered multiple responses to the 
question, “Where are people staying after their property has been foreclosed on?” 
The overwhelming majority [76.2 percent] stated that people were staying with 
family and friends. More than half [54.5 percent] stated that people were going to 
emergency shelters. Even more alarming, 41.6 percent said that these individuals 
and families who had lost their homes were already living on the streets.
Over one third [37.6 percent] stated that people were able to rent, which likely 
refers to former homeowners, who would be more likely to have the resources 
needed to move to a rental after losing their homes to foreclosure. About a third 
[29.7 percent] stated that people were going to transitional shelters, while about a 
quarter [22.8 percent] said that they did not know what was happening to people. 
ᅛ NCH, a national homeless advocacy organization, wanted to know whether state 
and local advocacy efforts were underway to address this crisis. Just under half of 
the survey respondents [48.2 percent] noted that there were coalition efforts in 
progress to prevent foreclosures and evictions. One forth [24.6 percent] said there 
were no such efforts. Almost a third [27.2 percent] said they didn’t know.
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ᅛ More heartening, 57.5 percent of respondents said that they were addressing the 
issue of homelessness in their work on evictions and foreclosures; 17.9 percent 
were not and nearly one quarter [24.5 percent] did not know.
ᅛ NCH received responses from 29 states.  Over three fourths, or 76 percent of the 
responses, came from five states: California, Florida, Kentucky, Minnesota and 
Texas. With the exception of Kentucky, this reflects the states hardest hit by the 
subprime meltdown. 
ᅛ The largest sector respondent to the NCH survey were direct service providers 
[40.5 percent]; 76.6 percent of those were multi-service agencies. The remaining 
agencies offered a wide range of direct services. The second largest sector 
reporting was government agencies, which accounted for 20.7 percent or 
respondents: 42 percent of the governmental responses came from Community 
Action Agencies; 21 percent from community development departments; followed 
by 12.5 percent each from housing authorities and foreclosure prevention 
specialists. Much smaller percentages reflected respondents from a range of 
governmental agencies, including law enforcement and redevelopment agencies. 
Local, state or national coalition respondents accounted for roughly 12.9 percent of 
all responses, with local homeless coalitions accounting for 60 percent of this 
sector’s total. 
ᅛ While urban and rural respondents saw increases in homelessness over the last 
year, far more responses came from urban areas [63 percent] than rural areas [46 
percent].
Figure 2: Foreclosure Trends in the US 
Source: RealtyTrac                                                             CNN.com/US Foreclosures up 75% By Les Christie, CNNMoney.com Staff Writer, 1-29-08
U.S. foreclosure filings 2005 – February 2008 
The number of foreclosure filings increased 75 percent from 2006 to 2007. The trend is 
continuing in 2008.
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NCH Recommendations 
Prevent homelessness.  
NCH urges policymakers at city, state and national levels to embrace homeless prevention 
as the cornerstone of every policy response. 
Rather than create a new homeless prevention program, at least a $300 million in new
appropriations should be immediately allocated  to the Emergency Food and Shelter 
Program (EFSP).  EFSP would provide an effective rent and mortgage relief mechanism, 
which are among the eligible uses of EFSP. These additional funds would be targeted to 
rent relief and other expenses related to housing.  Funds would be used to supplement but 
not supplant existing public funding for homeless prevention. It is imperative that the 
distribution formula for this new allocation not be based solely on unemployment figures, 
but also include foreclosure data and other measures of poverty in the locality receiving 
these funds.
– The New York Times provides policymakers with a model response to preventing 
homelessness at a citywide level. This news organization created the New York 
Times Neediest Cases Fund,  which helps prevent homelessness among families 
who lose their homes in foreclosure proceedings by awarding grants to cover 
moving expenses, the first month’s rent and the security deposit for a new 
apartment. The grant can also cover other emergency expenses.  Eligible families 
can receive up to $10,000. Grants are only available to homeowners as well as 
renters caught in the fallout when their landlords lose rentals to foreclosure.
This and other approaches will provide effective prevention models. NCH recommends 
that Congress and all state legislatures adopt a foreclosure and homeless prevention 
model.
– Credit: The NCH supports the following recommendations, drawn from Dr. Peter 
Drier, E.P. Clapp Distinguished Professor of Politics and Director of the Urban and 
Environmental Policy Program at Occidental College, Los Angeles. 
Recreate the National Home Owners Loan Corporation.
Provide federal relief for homeowners who have lost their homes or at immediate risk of 
losing them.  The federal government should help homeowners who have already lost 
their homes or who are at immediate risk of foreclosure. It should create an agency 
comparable to the Depression-era Home Owners Loan Corporation (HOLC), buy the 
mortgages, and remake the loans at reasonable rates backed by federal insurance.  
I.
II.
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In June 1933, the Congress approved the Home Owners’ Loan Act, and authorized $200 
million to set up the Home Owners' Loan Corporation (HOLC). The HOLC had the 
authority to issue $2 billion in tax-exempt bonds. The money enabled HOLC to help 
distressed families avert foreclosures by purchasing mortgages in or near default from 
banks, then issuing new loans that homeowners could afford. Financing was offered at up 
to 80 percent of assessed value, to a maximum of $14,000. In 1933, about half of all 
mortgage debt in default. Within a few years, almost one-fifth of all mortgages (about one 
million) were owned by the HOLC. The primary beneficiaries were homeowners at the 
lower end of the middle class who would have lost their homes. Ultimately, the HOLC 
experienced an 80 percent success rate on its loans.  When it was shut down in 1960, the 
HOLC returned a small profit to the federal government. While recognizing this successful 
practice, modern safeguards must be implemented to ensure that the practice of red-lining 
that occurred during the Depression is not repeated. 
Today, one-fifth of all mortgages would equate to about 10,000,000 loans or roughly $1.4 
trillion dollars. A modern version of HOLC would focus on rental investment properties and 
owner-occupied homes rather than homes purchased by absentee speculators. Federal 
resources used to assist either rental investment properties or owner-occupied homes  
should be targeted to those at highest risk of homelessness, with priority given to rental 
investment properties serving tenant with incomes at or below 30 percent of the Area 
Median Income or below and  homeowners with incomes at or below 80 percent of the 
Area Median Income.
Promote and enforce accountability for investors and banks and do not 
provide federal relief to investors or banks unless they agree to new 
ground rules. 
Washington should not bail out investors or banks, including Bear Stearns and its suitor, 
JP Morgan, without new ground rules. The federally brokered deal between Bear Stearns 
and JP Morgan came without consideration for the consumers who had the most to lose. 
Recent trends suggest that there will be similar failures in the foreseeable future, some 
among institutions considered too big to fail. The federal government must require that the 
industry be held accountable before providing hundreds of billions of dollars from the 
Federal Reserve, Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac and the Federal Home Loan Banks to prop up 
Wall Street institutions. Properties salvaged through the application of federal funds would 
be held to a guaranteed long-term period of affordability of 30 years with fixed interest of 
no more than 6 percent.
III.
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Consolidate the agencies charged with overseeing banks and financial 
institutions into one federal super-agency. 
Federal oversight has not kept pace with the dramatic transformation of the financial 
services industry. Four federal agencies -- the Federal Reserve, the Office of the 
Comptroller of the Currency, the Office of Thrift Supervision, and the Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation – each has jurisdiction over mortgage lending. States have 
jurisdiction over the growing number off nonbank mortgage lenders (which accounted for 
about 40 percent of new subprime loans) without any consistent regulatory standards. 
States are responsible for regulating the insurance industry (including homeowner 
insurance), and do so with widely varying levels of effectiveness. It is absurd to have so 
many competing and overlapping agencies involved in regulating financial services 
institutions, particularly because they are often at cross purposes with one another.
"We need to go in the direction of more regulatory consolidation," Sheila C. Bair, 
Chairwoman of the FDIC, recently told the New York Times. "It would make more sense to 
have some type of umbrella agency, if for no other reason than facilitating information.1"
    
Assign the federal government the role of Watchdog.
Senator Chris Dodd (D-Conn.), Chair of the Senate Banking Committee, and 
Representative Frank have proposed legislation to establish the federal government’s role 
as the finacial services industry’s watchdog. In this role, Congress would require lenders to 
verify applicants' income and document borrowers’ ability to pay. Private mortgage 
companies and brokers should fall under the umbrella of federal lending regulations, 
including conforming with requirements for registration and licensure. Wall Street and 
other mortgage investors should be held liable for the illegal practices of mortgage brokers 
and lenders originating loans. Lenders should be prohibited from steering borrowers 
toward more expensive loans and from influencing home appraisals. 
1 Andrews, Edmund and LaBaton, Stephen. Split Is Forming Over Regulation of Wall Street. New York Times: 
March 23, 2008. www.nytimes.com/2008/03/23/business/23regulate.html?pagewanted=print
IV.
V.
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Recommended Federal Strategies
The following strategies could help reduce the severity of the crisis on individuals and 
families who lose their homes to foreclosure2:
1. All federally insured mortgages resulting in foreclosure should protect the existing 
tenant’s duration. Unless a side agreement is struck between the new owner and 
existing tenant, the tenant’s lease survives the foreclosure process. It is recommended 
that states adopt similar protections for renters to prevent automatic eviction when a 
foreclosed property is transferred to a new owner.
2. Require (by state law) that residential mortgage foreclosures have foreclosure deeds 
appropriately entered into courthouse records within thirty days of the date of the 
foreclosure sale. This would help remedy the growing difficulty in identifying the buyers 
and renters of properties lost to foreclosure and provide contact information relative to 
creating short term lease arrangements. Owners or managers would be required to 
provide potential tenants with information about property status, thus ensuring that 
renters would not unknowingly enter into rental agreements on properties under 
foreclosure.
3. Create incentives (local, state and/or federal) for lenders who convey the foreclosed 
properties they acquire to nonprofit affordable housing entities (e.g., Community 
Development Corporations, Habitat for Humanity or land banks) at deeply discounted 
prices. Somewhat different approaches will be needed for owner-occupied housing and 
rental investment housing subject to foreclosure.  
4. Federal law should ensure that rental housing receiving housing assistance payments 
(e.g., vouchers or certificates), which are subsequently assisted through foreclosure 
with federal funds, be maintained without disruption to tenants. Payment status would 
remain undisturbed for the life of the contract, and would not be terminated as a result 
of mortgage foreclosure. Housing Assistance Programs [HAP] contracts on any and all 
rental investment housing shall be deemed unaffected by foreclosure and extended to 
a term of one year following the date of any foreclosure. The foreclosure sale 
purchaser would serve as landlord throughout the remaining life of the contract. If, at 
the end of the contract, the purchaser chooses not to operate under a HAP contract, 
s/he would assist renters losing their homes with finding alternative, suitable housing. 
5. The Federal Reserve should not allow the Bank of America to continue to grow unless 
there is a firm written commitment to serve its present and future customers by 
implementing the following for the benefit of endangered homeowners and tenants of 
rental investment properties living on incomes at or below 30 percent of the Area 
Median Income3.
a. Initiate an immediate foreclosure moratorium on all mortgage loans in the Bank 
of America and Countrywide portfolios, including those currently being serviced 
or that have been purchased back through a sheriff’s sale.  
2 Many of the recommended federal strategies are based on work by Dr. Frank Alexander, Emory Law School Professor 
and eminent resource on Landlord-Tenant Law, as provided in a March e-mail to NCH Board member Anita Beatty.
3 Some of the recommendations in #5 are partially attributable to the California Reinvestment Coalition, consistent with  
their March 5, 2008 letter to the Federal Reserve.  
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b. Modify loans for borrowers in danger of losing their homes or who are in the 
redemption process after a sheriff’s sale to a fixed rate of no more than six 
percent for 30 years.
c. Immediately provide nonprofits in local communities the opportunity to serve in a 
receivership role and/or to lease property for $1 / year. This mechanism would 
be used to assist prior homeowners and  rental investment property in 
foreclosure with developing refinancing plans that include interest rates at or 
below six percent for 30 years and/or allow residents to remain in their homes 
while continuing to pay rent or make payments toward Contracts for Deed on 
the property.
d. Pay nonprofits a management fee and require Bank of America to provide 
underwriter and loan officer staff time to renegotiate the loans. 
e. Allow communities and nonprofits to purchase property at a reasonable below 
market price, lease property for $1/year or donate property to nonprofits in order 
to maintain the affordability of housing in their communities. This would assist 
present homeowners and residents to remain in their homes and allow utilization 
of vacant homes as affordable housing opportunities for people living on low 
incomes. This strategy could include the use of land trusts. 
f. Bank of America filed its application to acquire Countrywide on February 19, 
2008. The notice on the Federal Reserve website was not posted until February 
29, 2008. Even though a 30-day period for comments is being offered based on 
the day the filing was posted, the National Coalition for the Homeless contends 
that the comment period should be extended. Because of the sub-prime crisis, 
the merger is unique. Without access to the Home Mortgage and Disclosure Act 
(HMDA) data for 2007, assessing the potential impact of the merger is 
impossible. As of March 1, 2008, lenders were required to supply HMDA data to 
anyone requesting it. The comment period should be extended 30 days past the 
date the banks were required to provide their HDMA data to the public. 
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The Subprime Meltdown: Impact on Communities
According to the Real Estate Section of MSN.com [see Appendix 1 for a complete list by 
state], there were 2,203,295 foreclosures filed in 2007: 1,597,616 were accounted for in 
the top ten states. The top ten states listed below accounted for nearly 73 percent of all 
filings.
According to the Center for Responsible Lending4 [See Appendix 2], the number of 
foreclosures in 2008-2009 is projected to double, ballooning to 2,258,457 homes lost to 
foreclosure. The top ten states follow.
4 Center for Responsible Lending. 2/25/2008. www.responsiblelending.org
Homes Lost to Foreclosure:  
the Top 10 States 2007 
California 481,392 
Florida 279,325 
Ohio 153,196 
Texas 149,703 
Michigan 136,205 
Georgia 99,578 
Illinois 90,782 
Colorado 71,149 
Arizona 69,970 
Nevada 66,316 
Total 1,597,616 
Homes Lost to Foreclosure:  
the Top 10 States 2008 - 2009 
California 357,000 
Florida 195,000 
Texas  150,000 
New York 125,000 
Arizona 86,000 
Ohio 86,000 
Georgia 84,000 
Minnesota   80,000 
Pennsylvania 76,000 
Virginia 62,000 
Total 1,300,000
The top 10 states 
account for 58 
percent of all 
projected
foreclosures for 
2008 – 2009. 
The top 10 states 
accounted for 73 
percent of all 
foreclosures in 
2007.
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People…Not Statistics
The statistics are so overwhelming it is easy to forget we are talking about people, 
individuals and families devastated by foreclosure.  Sandra Rolon is just one person, 
but her story puts a face on the numbers5.
Staff Sergeant Sandra Rolon spent more than a year in Kuwait, managing food service 
operations at a military base as part of the 408th Personnel Service Battalion in the U.S. 
Army Reserve. She thought of her time there in 2004 as a way both to serve her country 
and to pursue a more personal goal: buying a home. 
By the summer of 2007, Ms. Rolon had put a down 
payment of about $3,000 on a two-story tan-brick house 
with a patio on a narrow street in the Throgs Neck 
section of the Bronx. It was a home she knew she could 
not afford. The house was $468,000, and the monthly 
costs on her subprime mortgage were $4,000. She earns 
about $2,800 a month. The broker, she said, told her she 
could simply refinance the mortgage later. 
Ms. Rolon, 49, an administrative worker at an Army 
Reserve center on Long Island, was able to make the 
payments for just two months. She decided to redo the 
basement so she could rent out the rooms for extra 
income. But the men she paid $8,000 to do the work 
disappeared, leaving her a gutted basement with wires 
dangling from the ceiling and piles of wood on the floor.
Now, with the threat of foreclosure hanging over her, she 
is in limbo, fighting to keep her home as she looks after 
her 2-year-old grandson, unable to refinance and, for the 
past four months, unable to make her mortgage payments. She said she sometimes felt 
like going back overseas. “Life was easier,” Ms. Rolon said, wiping away tears. “You 
had your camaraderie. You don’t have that here. It’s a dog-eat-dog world here.”
Fortunately for Sandra, she is being helped by the New York Times Neediest Cases Fund.
If it were not for this fund, Sandra would most likely become homeless, joining the tens 
of thousands of veterans who served this nation only to find themselves on the streets of 
in shelters in communities around this nation. 
5 Fernandez, Manny. The Neediest Cases: Helping to Keep Homelessness at Bay as Foreclosures Hit 
More Families. New York Times: February 4, 2008.
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/02/04/nyregion/04neediest.html?_r=1&oref=slogin
The housing crisis is hitting 
veterans especially hard. 
As a recent Pentagon study 
has shown, military 
personnel are particularly 
vulnerable to predatory 
lending, and the financial 
stresses for many military 
families have been well 
documented.
– Ellen Harnick, Senior Policy Counsel, 
Center for Responsible Lending.
http://veterans.house.gov/hearings/hear
ing.aspx?NewsID=198
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Impact on communities 
The National League of Cities [NLC] reports that nearly two-thirds of 200 cities 
responding to an online/e-mail poll experienced a local increase in foreclosures during 
the past year, with one-third seeing declines in city revenues as a result. This report 
was based on a poll conducted and released by the NLC during the Congressional City 
Conference. The poll also found that more than half of these cities saw increases in the 
need for temporary assistance for services such as counseling, food banks and other 
non-housing supportive services6.
Foreclosures Taking Big Toll on Cities and City Finances7
“Mortgage foreclosures are causing havoc in many of our communities,” said NLC 
President Cynthia McCollum, council member, Madison, Alabama. “Cities are already 
seeing reductions in their revenues at the same time that more services are needed to 
address the many related problems caused by the foreclosures. Unfortunately we also 
know that the problems will continue for many years before they get better.  That’s a 
tough situation for all of us.” 
Of particular note is the ripple effect the housing crisis has on city finances. One out of 
three cities reporting stated that funding for programs and projects has declined in the 
past year. Also significant is the increase in abandoned and/or vacant properties and other 
forms of blight, a consequence reported by one-third of the cities.
“In one new community in Charlotte, N.C., 115 out of 123 homes were boarded up,” said
McCollum. “Where there are widespread foreclosures, cities must ensure the safety of 
the residents still living in the community, must keep the grass mowed, and stop 
vandalism.” 
6 Appel, Sherry Conway. Foreclosures Taking Big Toll on Cities and City Finances. National League of 
Cities. http://www.nlc.org/articles/articleitems/ncw31708/foreclosurerelease.aspx
7 Ibid.
Abandoned row houses in Baltimore, Maryland. 
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In Charlotte, North 
Carolina, nearly 70% 
of homes are boarded 
up, ensuring little 
protection and safety 
to those remaining in 
the community. 
“We know that homeownership strengthens our communities — the housing crisis is 
making it more difficult to achieve this goal. Overall, financial 
stability of millions of Americans is in jeopardy,” McCollum 
said.
The NLC poll shows that the housing crisis is disproportionately 
impacting certain residents, with half reporting the crisis is 
affecting lower-income families; one-third seeing problems for 
families headed by single parents; and one in five seeing impacts 
on seniors and people of color. 
The poll also shows that in more than half of the cities, the 
lending community has not reached out to local officials to offer help or support in 
dealing with foreclosures and housing finance-related impacts. The groups working most 
closely with cities are nonprofit and civic organizations, followed by state governments 
and other local governments.
The poorest counties in the United States are among the hardest hit by the subprime 
mortgage crisis, according to a study released by the Christian anti-hunger advocacy 
group, Bread for the World. The report, Home Ownership, Subprime Loans and 
Poverty8, found a strong correlation between poverty rates and percentages of 
subprime mortgages. In eight of the country’s 15 poorest counties, where poverty rates 
exceed 40 percent, the percentage of homeowners holding subprime mortgages is even 
higher — up to 60 percent, according to the study.
Beyond the increase in homelessness, the ripple effect of the foreclosure crisis is 
profound. America's Second Harvest is the largest charitable domestic hunger-relief 
organization in the United States. In its article, Hungry Americans Cannot Wait for New 
Farm Bill 9, President and Chief Executive Officer Vicki Escarra says, “We have seen 
dramatic declines in commodity support from the federal government and private food 
donations. Every day that goes by without a new Farm Bill is a day without hope for 
food banks around the country. Our member food banks are being forced to dip into 
their limited financial reserves to purchase food and ration it to people in need." 
– Federal commodity support has fallen by nearly $200 million per year since the 
enactment of the last Farm Bill in 2002. This drop in federal support is due to less 
need for the federal government to buy surplus foods to support agricultural 
producers10.
8 Strieb, Matthew. Study links subprime mortgage crisis to U.S. poverty & hunger. 3/14/08.
http://www.baptiststandard.com/postnuke/index.php?module=htmlpages&func=display&pid=7541
9 America’s Second Harvest Newsroom. Hungry Americans Cannot Wait for New Farm Bill. 
http://www.secondharvest.org/news_room/2008_press_releases/031908.html
10 Ibid. 
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– Economic downturn has created as much as a 30 percent increase in demand for 
food assistance at food banks, food pantries and soup kitchens in many parts of 
the country11.
– Food price inflation is higher than it has been at any time in recent memory, and 
people who rely on food stamp benefits to feed their families are seeing a rapid 
erosion in their purchasing power. Benefit levels are set once per year, but food 
prices have risen 5.5 percent since the last adjustment just six months ago12.
In addition to increases in hunger and homelessness, there are media reports of an 
increase in crime. According to at least one report13 this pattern is cropping up in 
communities across the nation. Mark Wiseman, Director of Cuyahoga County 
Foreclosure Prevention Program in Cleveland, Ohio, has said that there are entire 
blocks of homes in Cleveland where 60 or 70 percent of houses are boarded up. “I don't 
think there are enough police to go after criminals holed up in those houses, squatting 
or doing drug deals or whatever,” Wiseman said. 
Abandoned homes in the Slavic Village area of Cleveland, Ohio.  
The article goes on to say that “health risks are also on the rise.  All those empty 
swimming pools in California's Inland Empire have become breeding grounds for 
mosquitoes, which can transmit the deadly West Nile virus, Riverside County officials 
say.14”
In addition to short-term costs that include homelessness, hunger, and increased 
lawlessness, inspection and code enforcement are longer term costs generated by 
lower home values and concomitant reductions in local tax revenues. This is 
documented by the National League of Cities survey findings quoted above15.  Past 
11 Ibid. 
12 Ibid.
13 Tent City in Suburbs is Cost of Nation's Foreclosure Crisis. December 21, 2007 www.care2.com
14 Tent City in Suburbs is Cost of Nation's Foreclosure Crisis. December 21, 2007 www.care2.com
15 Appel, Sherry Conway. Foreclosures Taking Big Toll on Cities and City Finances. National League of 
Cities. http://www.nlc.org/articles/articleitems/ncw31708/foreclosurerelease.aspx
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practices have provided the National Coalition for the Homeless good reason to fear 
that as communities seek to balance their budgets with decreased revenues, the first 
cuts will be to the very human service programs communities need to respond to the 
impacts of the foreclosure crisis. 
Know Your Rights 
Minnesota’s Ramsey and Hennepin counties are taking a proactive response to the 
effects of foreclosures on homelessness.  According to the Star Tribune16,  the state’s 
homeless agency is developing a questionnaire for workers to give to homeless people. 
The intent is to better pinpoint the effects of foreclosures.  The Hennepin County 
Taskforce on Foreclosures has created a series of recommendations to help tenants. 
The major one is called, Know Your Rights. The local sheriff's office has also developed 
a rights fact sheet for renters who get notice of a sheriff's sale.  Advocates are seeking a 
change in state law that would allow civil servants to deliver the fact sheet as well. 
“If there's a reasonable way to help those owners, we can have a direct impact on 
homelessness, here and around the country,” said Tracy Bergland, the Director of 
Housing for Catholic Charities17.
Sadly, Hennepin County is the rare exception in terms of communities taking proactive 
measures to address the foreclosure crisis and its impact on homelessness.  For most 
of the nation, homeless individuals and families remain the invisible victims of the 
subprime meltdown.
Conclusion
The documentation is clear: there is a strong link between the foreclosure crisis and 
increasing homelessness in communities throughout the nation. Before the crisis grows 
to epidemic proportions, It is imperative that policymakers at all levels adopt homeless 
prevention strategies as part of all legislative proposals designed to address the 
foreclosure crisis.  Failure to do so will add countless thousands to the ranks of the 
homeless individuals and families in our communities.
This report is a National Call to Action to end and prevent homeless for the victims of 
the subprime foreclosure crisis.
Finally, NCH sees those legislative steps as the first steps in the direction of ending and 
preventing homelessness overall through passage of the Bring America Home Act,
which was introduced by the late Congresswoman Julia Carson more than three years 
ago.
The time has come to definitively end the national disgrace of homelessness in our 
nation.
16 Brandt, Steve and Wolfe, Warren. A Wave of Foreclosure Hits Renters. Star Tribune: October 29, 2007. 
http://www.startribune.com/business/11245186.html
17 Ibid.
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Methodology 
The National Coalition for the Homeless [NCH] created the first draft of its survey 
instrument, The Impact of Foreclosures on Homelessness, in mid-January 2008. it was 
field tested in Montana and Minnesota to test the reliability of the survey instrument.  
Based upon responses to the draft, NCH revised the survey. The final version was first 
emailed on January 22, 2008 to all known local and state homeless coalitions in the 
nation.  They were asked to forward it to their email lists to get as wide a distribution as 
possible.  A second email from NCH in late February was distributed to the same 
coalition list, with the notification that the deadline was March 15, 2008.  NCH received 
a total of 122 responses in this timeframe, of which 117 were valid responses. 
Finally, for the purposes of this survey, NCH used the US Census definition of “rural”, 
which includes “Territory, population and housing units not classified as urban. Rural 
classification cuts across other hierarchies and can be in metropolitan or non-
metropolitan areas” in which urban is defined as a total “population of at least 2,500 for 
urban clusters, or at least 50,000 for urbanized areas.”18
18 US Census Bureau. Question and Answer Center. Retrieved March 2008.   
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Findings 
1. Overall responses:  Table 1 is an analysis of 117 responses to the key 
questions asked in the NCH survey. 
Chart 1: Overall responses 
Responses Number  Percent 
     
Increase in homelessness     
Yes 70 60.9% 
No 6 5.2% 
Don't know 39 33.9% 
Total 115 100.0%  
How do you know?     
     Total responses:  83 [multiple responses]     
     Government Report 21 25.3% 
     Local Media 47 56.6% 
     National Media 32 38.6% 
     Emergency Shelter reports 46 55.4% 
     Anecdotal from clients 45 54.2% 
Where are people staying?     
     Total responses:  101 [multiple responses]     
     Emergency shelters 55 54.5% 
     Transitional shelters 30 29.7% 
     Family/friends 77 76.2% 
     On the streets 42 41.6% 
     Renting  38 37.6% 
     Don't know 23 22.8% 
Is your local coalition working on:     
Preventing foreclosures & evictions     
Yes 55 48.2% 
No 28 24.6% 
Don't know 31 27.2% 
      
     Addressing issues of potential     
     homelessness in their work on      
     foreclosures and evictions     
Yes 61 57.5% 
No 19 17.9% 
Don't know 26 24.5% 
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Increase in homelessness 
The most significant finding is that nearly 61 percent of respondents saw an increase in 
homelessness in the interim since the foreclosure crisis began in 2007. Only 5 percent 
indicated that they had not seen an increase and almost one-third did not know.
Beyond anecdotes: Media and shelter reporting 
Seventy-two (72) percent of respondents [83 out of 115] provided multiple responses to 
the question “how do you know there has been an increase?” More than 50 percent 
indicated that their sources for this information included local media reports [56.6 
percent], followed by reports from local emergency shelters [55.4 percent] and reports 
from clients [54.2 percent].  Almost 40 percent [38.6 percent] indicated that national 
media reports had been their information source, while only one-quarter [25.3 percent] 
stated that a government report was the source of their information.  This latter point 
indicates that the link between foreclosures and homelessness has not yet been 
captured in the national media spotlight, nor have governmental agencies been tracking 
this crisis. 
Where are people staying? 
Most (88 percent) of respondents offered multiple responses to the question, “Where 
are people staying after their property has been foreclosed on?”
– An overwhelming 76.2 percent stated that people were staying with family and 
friends.  This is not surprising. Typically, staying with family and friends is the first 
line of defense against becoming homeless, either calling the streets or a shelter 
“home.” This also foreshadows a trend of growing homelessness as people wear 
out their welcome after doubling or tripling up with family and friends.
– The second largest response, 54.5 percent, was that people were going to 
emergency shelters.
– This was  followed by more than forty percent [41.6 percent] stating that people 
were living on the streets of their communities.
– More than one third [37.6 percent] stated that people were able to rent, which 
may mean that this group was comprised of more homeowners than renters. 
Prior homeowners would likely have the necessary resources to be able to rent 
after losing their homes to foreclosure.
– About a third [29.7 percent] stated that people were going to transitional shelters. 
– Almost a quarter [22.8 percent] stated they did not know what was happening to 
people. This could mean that there are many invisible victims of the foreclosure 
crisis, people in communities around the nation who are falling through the 
cracks.
Local advocacy
NCH, as a national homeless advocacy organization, wanted to know whether there 
were state and local advocacy efforts underway to address this crisis.  Sadly, fewer than 
half of respondents [48.2 percent] indicated that there were coalition efforts to prevent 
foreclosure and eviction. A quarter [24.6 percent] indicated that there were no efforts, 
and almost a third [27.2 percent] said they didn’t know.
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More heartening was the 57.5 percent of respondents who indicated that they were 
addressing the issue of homelessness in their work on evictions and foreclosures, even 
though 17.9 percent said they were not, and 24.5 percent did not know.
From the NCH perspective, there is still much to be done at state and local advocacy 
levels to mitigate the foreclosure crisis for homeowners and renters and to prevent the 
crisis from swelling the ranks of the homeless in our nation. Paramount is that local, 
state and federal responses must include homelessness prevention in all legislative 
responses to the subprime meltdown. 
2. Responses by state and local communities 
Communities in 29 states responded to the NCH survey.  The top five states in terms of 
response were California, Florida, Kentucky, Minnesota and Texas, which together 
provided 76 percent of all responses. With the exception of Kentucky, this list reflects 
the states hit hardest by the subprime meltdown. 
Tables 2 through 4 synthesize their responses. 
Table 2. State Increase in Homelessness:  Percentages Within Overall Group
Percent of Responses  
Within Overall Group California  Florida   Kentucky  
Minnesota
  Texas  Total
Yes 25% 26% 6% 12% 7% 76%
No  22% 56% 0 0 0 78%
I don't know 10% 3% 13% 3% 18% 47%
Increase in homelessness
As indicated in Table 3, while all five states saw an increase in homelessness due to the 
foreclosure crisis, three of the five [California, Florida and Minnesota] reported 
increases above the overall response. [74 percent, 70 percent and 89 percent 
respectively] the overall response [See Table 1 above] of close to 60 percent. [See 
Appendix 3 for complete results by the responding states]. 
Table 3. Increase in Homelessness by State Responses  
Percent of Responses  
Within Each State California  Florida  Kentucky Minnesota Texas  
Yes 74% 70% 44% 89% 42% 
No  9% 25% 0% 0% 0% 
I don't know 17% 5% 55% 11% 58% 
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Beyond anecdotes: Media and shelter reporting 
As Table 4 indicates, the results to the question “how do you know there is an increase 
in homelessness” are generally consistent with the results found in Table 1 [above] in 
that respondents indicated multiple sources for the sources of their information. 
Table 4. How do you know? 
California Florida Kentucky Minnesota Texas 
How do you know?   # % # % # % # % # % 
Government  5 9% 2 5% 1 25% 2 8% 2 10% 
Local Media  12 21% 9 24% 1 25% 4 15% 3 14% 
National Media  8 14% 4 11% 1 25% 3 12% 3 14% 
Shelter Report  9 15% 10 26% 1 25% 4 15% 3 14% 
Anecdotal  11 19% 7 18% 0   6 23% 4 19% 
Other  13 22% 6 16% 0   7 27% 6 29% 
Total  58 100% 38 100% 4 100% 26 100% 21 100% 
California Florida  Kentucky Minnesota Texas    Where are people staying?  
# % # % # % # % # % 
Emergency Shelter 9 15% 13 25% 3 19% 7 29% 3 16% 
Transitional Shelter  10 16% 6 12% 0 0 2 8% 1 5% 
With Family/Friends  14 23% 15 29% 6 38% 9 38% 3 16% 
On the Street  10 16% 9 17% 2 13% 4 17% 3 16% 
Rental Home  11 18% 7 13% 4 25% 1 4% 1 5% 
I Don’t Know  2 3% 0 0 0 0 1 4% 7 37% 
Other  5 9% 2 4% 1 6% 0 0 1 5% 
Total  61 100% 52 100% 16 100% 24 100% 19 100% 
Is your local coalition working on:   
California Florida  Kentucky Minnesota Texas   Preventing foreclosures 
and evictions?   # % # % # % # % # % 
Yes 10 44% 9 45% 4 45% 4 45% 6 50% 
No  6 26% 6 30% 1 11% 2 22% 0 0 
I don’t know  7 30% 5 25% 4 45% 3 33% 6 50% 
Total 23 100% 20 100% 9 100% 9 100% 12 100% 
California Florida  Kentucky Minnesota Texas  Addressing Issues   of 
homelessness?    # % # % # % # % # % 
Yes 3 13% 11 55% 6 67% 6 67% 7 58% 
No   9 39% 5 25% 0 0 1 11% 0 0 
I don’t know  11 48% 4 20% 3 33% 2 22% 5 42% 
Total  23 100% 20 100% 9 100% 9 100% 12 100% 
Note: See Appendix 3 for a complete table of responses by state.
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3. Responses by organizational type  
Table 5: Organizational and individual responses: 
TYPE
NUMB
ER  percent of Total 
Coalition     
     Local 9 60%
     State 5 33%
     National 1 7%
Subtotal 15 12.9%
Direct Service     
     Multi-service 36 76.6%
     Shelter 1 2%
     Mental Health 1 2%
     Independent Living 2 4%
     Health Care 5 11%
     Legal  Aid 1 2%
     Employment Counselor 1 2%
Subtotal 47 40.5%
Nonprofit Housing 11 9.5%
Land Trust 1 0.9%
Governmental     
     Homeless Coordinator 1 4%
     Housing Authority 3 12.5%
     Community Development 5 21%
     Foreclosure Prevention 3 12.5%
     Law Enforcement 1 4%
     Community Action Agency 10 42%
     Redevelopment Agency 1 4%
Subtotal 24 20.7%
Interfaith 6 5.2%
Education     
     College 1 20%
     High School 3 60%
     Student 1 20%
Subtotal 5 4.3%
Individuals     
     Homeless 3 43%
     Unemployed 1 14%
     Retired 1 14%
    Consultant 2 29%
Subtotal 7 6.0%
TOTAL 116 100.0%
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A wide range of organizational and individual respondents
Service providers 
Not surprisingly, the largest sector responding to the NCH survey was direct service 
[40.5 percent], with over three fourths [76.6 percent] multi-service agencies and the 
remainder representing a wide range of direct services.
Government agencies 
The second largest sector was a wide range of government agencies, accounting for 
almost 21 percent of this sector’s total [20.7%].  Approximately 42 percent of 
governmental responses came from Community Action Agencies; 21 percent came 
from community development departments; housing authorities and foreclosure 
prevention specialists accounted for 12.5 percent each, with much smaller percentages 
came from a range of governmental agencies, including law enforcement and 
redevelopment agencies.
Coalitions
Roughly 13 percent of responses came from the coalition sector, which included local, 
state and national coalitions. Local homeless coalitions accounted for 60 percent of 
these responses. 
A range of sector responses 
The remainder of organizational and individual responses were much smaller 
percentages of the total, with nonprofit housing developers accounting for 9.5 percent of 
total responses, followed by individuals [6%], including several homeless people and 
those who were unemployed or retired.  This was followed by interfaith responses 
[5.2%], and educational institutions [4.3%], which included colleges or high schools. 
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4. Urban versus rural responses 
Table 6:  Urban versus Rural responses 
Responses Rural # Rural % Urban # Urban % 
Increase in homelessness 
     No 3 7% 2 3% 
     N/A 5 13% 2 3% 
     Don't know 14 34% 24 31% 
     Yes 19 46% 48 63% 
Total 41 100% 76 100% 
How do you know?     
     Other 10 17% 34 22% 
     Government Report 6 10% 11 7% 
     National Media 8 14% 20 13% 
     Anecdotal from clients 10 17% 31 20% 
     Local Media 12 20% 30 19% 
     Emergency Shelter reports 13 22% 29 19% 
Total 59 100% 155 100% 
Where are people staying?     
     Other 4 5% 11 6% 
     Don't know 4 5% 15 9% 
     Transitional shelters 8 9% 18 10% 
     Renting  9 10% 26 15% 
     On the streets 16 19% 24 14% 
     Emergency shelters 18 21% 35 20% 
     Family/Friends 27 31% 46 26% 
Total 86 100% 175 100% 
Is your local coalition working on:     
Preventing foreclosures and evictions     
         N/A 3 7% 6 8% 
         No 8 20% 18 24% 
         Don't know 14 34% 16 21% 
         Yes 16 39% 36 47% 
                 Total 41 100% 76 100% 
     Addressing issues of potential   
     homelessness in their work on    
     foreclosures and evictions   
         No 5 12% 12 16% 
         N/A 5 12% 11 14% 
         Don't know 12 29% 13 17% 
         Yes 19 47% 40 53% 
                 Total 41 100% 76 100% 
Note:  See Appendix 4 for a complete chart of urban versus rural cities.
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NCH wanted to evaluate whether there were any differences from a rural versus urban 
perspective relative to the intersection of the foreclosure crisis and homelessness.  
Generally speaking, there are minimal differences with the following exceptions: 
Increase in homelessness 
While both urban and rural respondents saw increases in homelessness over the 
last year, there was a significant difference between urban [63%] versus rural 
responses [46%].  Part of this could be definitional, since the percentage staying 
with family and friends was greater among rural respondents. 
Where are people staying? 
Generally, there were not major differences between urban versus rural 
responses, although there were slight, but important differences in the following: 
 A higher percentage of urban respondents [15% compared to 10% of rural 
respondents] indicated that people were renting; 
 A higher percentage of rural respondents [19% compared to 15% of urban 
respondents] said that people were on the streets; and
 A higher percentage of rural respondents [31% compared to 26% of urban 
respondents] said that people were staying with family and friends. 
Local advocacy efforts 
There were also significant differences in the urban versus rural advocacy 
responses to this crisis.  While advocacy efforts existed in both settings, the 
percentage of urban areas on preventing foreclosures and evictions [47%] was 
higher than rural areas [39%], and the percentage of urban areas working to 
address homelessness due to evictions and foreclosures  [53%] was higher than 
rural areas [47%].  NCH suspects that part of this difference might be due to the 
greater concentration of coalition-building and advocacy resources available to 
urban areas.  Additionally, the issues of  remote locations, large distances and 
lack of communication in rural areas might be variables that account for these 
differences.
Note:  See Appendix 5 for a complete, state by state, listing of current legislation 
complied by the national advocacy organization, ACORN. 
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Appendix 1: 2007 Foreclosure Filings by State 
Source:  MSN.com Real Estate 
Rate Rank State Name
Total # of 
filings
% Change 
from 2006
% Change 
from 2005
Total # of 
properties
% Households
1 Nevada 66,316 215.12 758.68 34,417 3.376 
2 Florida 279,325 123.96 129.25 165,291 2.002 
3 Michigan 136,205 68.32 282.22 87,210 1.947 
4 California 481,392 237.99 681.95 249,513 1.921 
5 Colorado 71,149 29.96 140.12 39,403 1.919 
6 Ohio 153,196 87.93 207.35 89,979 1.797 
7 Georgia 99,578 31.07 118.43 59,057 1.566 
8 Arizona 69,970 150.91 160.7 38,568 1.516 
9 Illinois 90,782 25.29 94.3 64,310 1.25 
10 Indiana 52,930 11.31 73.57 27,980 1.027 
11 Tennessee 45,834 24.56 65.66 25,914 0.983 
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Rate Rank State Name
Total # of 
filings
% Change 
from 2006
% Change 
from 2005
Total # of 
properties
% Households
12 Texas 149,703 -4.57 9.22 84,469 0.936 
13 Missouri 32,022 80.93 176.74 23,492 0.906 
14 New Jersey 53,652 34.06 52.75 31,071 0.902 
15 Utah 9,668 -25.87 -16.19 7,438 0.852 
16 Connecticut 23,470 100.05* 111.38* 11,860 0.833 
17 Maryland 25,109 455.26 388.41 18,879 0.83 
18 North Carolina 37,426 66.52 135.07 29,101 0.739 
19 Massachusetts 41,487 161.14 751.36 17,737 0.66 
20 Idaho 6,032 140.51* 119.83* 3,640 0.611 
21 Washington 23,705 27.95 59.47 15,184 0.573 
22 Oregon 10,746 12.25 56.76 8,461 0.543 
23 Oklahoma 13,594 -12.78 0.71 8,256 0.52 
24 Virginia 24,199 456.3 728.73 16,307 0.514 
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Rate Rank State Name
Total # of 
filings
% Change 
from 2006
% Change 
from 2005
Total # of 
properties
% Households
25 Minnesota 13,615 127.11* 506.73* 11,557 0.513 
26 Arkansas 14,310 26.44 23.58 6,406 0.513
27 New York 57,350 10.19 54.72 38,688 0.493
28 Alaska 1,650 54.64 17.69 1,332 0.486
29 Wisconsin 17,503 131.15* 241.79* 12,133 0.486
30 Nebraska 3,971 30.88 91.84 3,636 0.474
31 Rhode Island 3,241 153.80* 7804.88* 1,838 0.41
32 New Mexico 3,893 -26.04 -46.55 2,994 0.357
33 Iowa 7,404 114.92* 251.90* 4,103 0.314
34 Pennsylvania 34,089 -11.07 18.98 16,379 0.302
35 Kentucky 8,793 23.45 76.96 5,105 0.274
36 Montana 1,378 29.27 52.6 1,150 0.268
37 Alabama 7,903 81.76 83.07 5,572 0.268
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Rate Rank State Name
Total # of 
filings
% Change 
from 2006
% Change 
from 2005
Total # of 
properties
% Households
38 Delaware 1,430 225.00* 342.72* 999 0.266
39 South Carolina 5,038 -27.56 -33.76 4,247 0.22
40 New Hampshire N/A N/A N/A 1,238 0.212
41 Louisiana 7,331 151.58* 90.61 3,968 0.204
42 Kansas 4,978 20.85 161.31* 2,434 0.203
43 Hawaii 1,270 88.71 -60.39 966 0.197
44 Wyoming 497 21.52 99.6 356 0.151
45 Mississippi 1,997 91.65 4.55 1,409 0.114
46 North Dakota 308 74.01 86.67 250 0.082
47 West Virginia 1,135 30.31 10.95 460 0.053
48 Maine N/A N/A N/A 286 0.042
49 Vermont 61 35.56 1.67 29 0.009
50 South Dakota N/A N/A N/A 24 0.007
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Rate Rank State Name
Total # of 
filings
% Change 
from 2006
% Change 
from 2005
Total # of 
properties
% Households
 District of Columbia 800 607.96* 393.83* 777 0.28
-- U.S. 2,203,295 74.99 148.83 1,285,873 1.033
*Actual increase may not be as high due to improved or expanded data coverage in this state.  
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Appendix 2:  Center for Responsible Lending 
Source: Center for Responsible Lending 
Estimates for 2008-2009 suggest that 
2,258,457 more homes will be lost to 
foreclosure in the United States.
Homes Lost to Foreclosure:  
the Top 10 States in 2007 
California 357,000 
Florida 195,000 
Texas 150,000 
New York 125,000 
  Ohio 86,000 
Arizona 86,000 
Georgia 84,000 
Minnesota 80,000 
Pennsylvania 76,000 
Virginia 62,000 
Total 1,300,000 
The 1,300,000 homes
lost in the top 10 
states represent 58% 
of all homes lost in 
the 50 states. 
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Appendix 3:  State charts 
State  Increase in Homelessness Total 
  Yes  No  I don't know   
AK   1 1 2 
CA  17 2 4 23 
CO    1 1 
CT    1 1 
DE  1   1 
FL  14 5 1 20 
IL   1  1 
IN  1   1 
KY  4 0 5 9 
MD    2 2 
MI  5  1 6 
MN  8 0 1 9 
MO    1 1 
MT  1   1 
ND  2  2 4 
NE    4 4 
NH  2   2 
NM    1 1 
NY    2 2 
OH  1   1 
OR  1   1 
PA  1  2 3 
SC  1  1 2 
TN  2   2 
TX  5 0 7 12 
VA    1 1 
VT  1  2 3 
WA 1   1 
Totals 68 9 40 117
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State  How do you know?  
Gov't Local Media National Media Shelter Report Anecdotal Other   Total   
AK       0 0 
CA 5 12 8 9 11 13 58 27% 
CO      1 1 0.5% 
CT  1  1   2 0.9% 
DE      1 1 0.5% 
FL 2 9 4 10 7 6 38 18% 
IL  1  1   2 1% 
IN 1 1 1    3 1.4% 
KY 1 1 1 1   4 2% 
MD       0 0 
MI  2  2 5 2 11 5% 
MN 2 4 3 4 6 7 26 12% 
MO       0 0 
MT    1  1 2 1% 
ND   1 1 1 1 4 2% 
NE 1 1  1   3 1.4% 
NH      1 1 0.5% 
NM   1    1 0.5% 
NY 1 1 1 1   4 2% 
OH  1   1 1 3 1.4% 
OR  1 1 1 1 1 5 2% 
PA 1 1 2 1 1 1 7 3% 
SC  1  1 1 1 4 2% 
TN 1 2 2 1 1 1 8 4% 
TX 2 3 3 3 4 6 21 10% 
VA       0 0 
VT    2 1  3 1.4% 
WA    1 1  2 1% 
Total  42 28 42 41 44 214 100.00%
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State  Where are people staying?  
Emergency 
Shelter
Transitional 
Shelter
With Family/ 
Friends
On the 
Street  Rental  
Don’t
know  Other  Total Percent 
AK    2     2 0.76%
CA  9 10 14 10 11 2 5 61 23.37%
CO    1  1   2 0.76%
CT         0 0
DE       1  1 0.38%
FL  13 6 15 9 7 0 2 52 19.90%
IL  1  1     2 0.76%
IN    1  1   2 0.76%
KY  3 0 6 2 4 0 1 16 6.13%
MD       1  1 0.38%
MI  4  4 1 1 2 1 13 4.98%
MN  7 2 9 4 1 1 0 24 9.19%
MO         0 0
MT  1 1 1 1    4 1.53%
ND  1  2  1   4 1.53%
NE    2   2  4 1.53%
NH  2 2 2 2   1 9 3.44%
NM       1  1 0.38%
NY    1 1 1   3 1.14%
OH  1 1 1 1    4 1.53%
OR  1 1 1 1 1  1 6 2.29%
PA  1 1 1 1 1 1 1 7 2.68%
SC  1 1 1  1   4 1.53%
TN  1  2 1 2  1 7 2.68%
TX  3 1 3 3 1 7 1 19 7.27%
VA         0 0
VT  2 1 2 2  1 1 9 3.44%
WA  1   1 1 1     4 1.53%
Total 52 27 73 40 35 19 15 261 99.87%
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Is your local coalition working on: 
Preventing foreclosures and evictions? Addressing issues of homelessness? 
STATE Yes No I don’t know Total Yes No I don’t know Total
AK  2 0 0 2 1 0 1 2
CA  10 6 7 23 9 3 11 23
CO  1 0 0 1 1 0 0 1
CT  0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1
DE  1 0 0 1 0 1 0 1
FL  9 6 5 20 11 5 4 20
IL  0 0 1 1 1 0 0 1
IN  1 0 0 1 1 0 0 1
KY  4 1 4 9 6 0 3 9
MD  0 1 1 2 0 1 1 2
MI  5 1 0 6 4 1 1 6
MN  4 2 3 9 6 1 2 9
MO  0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1
MT  0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1
ND  1 3 0 4 3 1 0 4
NE  0 0 4 4 0 0 4 4
NH  1 1 0 2 0 1 1 2
NM  0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1
NY  0 0 2 2 0 0 2 2
OH  1 0 0 1 1 0 0 1
OR  1 0 0 1 1 0 0 1
PA  0 1 2 3 0 1 2 3
SC  1 0 1 2 1 0 1 2
TN  0 2 0 2 2 0 0 2
TX  6 0 6 12 7 0 5 12
VA  1 0 0 1 1 0 0 1
VT  3 0 0 3 3 0 0 3
WA   0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1
Total 52 26 39 117 59 17 41 117
Percent  45% 22% 33% 100% 50% 15% 35% 100%
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Appendix 4:  Rural versus Urban Cities/State Chart
Urban Cities Urban Cities Rural Cities 
 Alaska New Mexico Kentucky
– Anchorage – Albuquerque – Covington 
California New York – Henderson 
– Bakersfield – Mount Vernon – Latonia 
– Chico Oregon – Lebanon (2) 
– Diamond Bar – Salem – Newport 
– Long Beach (2) Pennsylvania – Winchester 
– Los Angeles (4) – Philadelphia – Williamstown 
– Modesto – Pittsburgh Maryland 
– Pasadena South Carolina – Bladensburg 
– Pomona – Greenville – Hagerstown 
– Sacramento Tennessee Michigan
– San Bernardino (3) – Memphis – Ypsilanti 
– San Francisco – Knoxville Minnesota 
– Stockton Texas – Moorhead 
– Vallejo – Abilene (4) – Hopkins 
– Victorville – Brownsville – Vadnais Heights 
Colorado – Dallas Missouri
– Denver – Denton – Crocker
Delaware – Houston (2) North Dakota 
– Wilmington – Irving Minot 
Florida – Lubbock Williston 
– Fort Lauderdale Virginia Nebraska 
– Homestead – Alexandria – Creighton 
– Key West (2) Vermont – Fairbury 
– Lakeland – Burlington – Lexington 
– Lauderhill Washington – Wisner 
– Miami (5) – Vancouver New Hampshire 
– Orlando Total reports from urban cities: 76 Northfield 
– Sunrise Total percent urban: 65% – Tilton 
– Tallahassee New York 
Illinois – Deer Park 
– Chicago Rural Cities Ohio 
Indiana  Alaska – Fremont
Elkhart – Sitka Pennsylvania
Kentucky California – New Castle 
Owensboro – Claremont Texas
Michigan – Murphys – Big Spring 
– Ann Arbor (4) – Jackson South Carolina 
– Pontiac Connecticut  – Camden 
Minnesota – Willimantic Vermont
– Duluth Florida – Burlington (2) 
Minneapolis (4) – Islamorada 
Total reports from rural 
communities: 41 
Falls – New Port Richey Total percent rural: 35% 
Montana – Pinellas Park 
– Missoula – Plantation 
North Dakota – Winter Haven (2) 
– Grand Forks 
– Fargo 
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Appendix 5:  State by state initiatives  
Source:  ACORN
Association of Community Organizations for Reform Now: www.acorn.org
HIGHLIGHTS
– Massachusetts now provides for a 90 day "Right to Cure" for borrowers who fall 
behind.
– Maryland has a bill pending that would extend the length of the foreclosure process 
from 15 to nearly 150 days.
– New York’s Governor is drafting legislation that would require a pre-foreclosure 
notice that would halt property seizures for “a period of time” while the borrowers 
work with lenders and credit counselors to negotiate new mortgage terms.
– Ohio has proposed a rule change that would force lenders to provide six months' 
notice to homeowners with ARMs before the rate is reset. 
Relevant initiatives are summarized immediately below. Proposals and implemented 
plans are detailed by state. The state list is not comprehensive because states whose 
proposals duplicate those already detailed have not been added. 
INITIATIVES (includes those that are implemented as well as those proposed) 
 Establish a fund to refinance subprime mortgages. Targeted to borrowers who 
have good payment histories, are residing in the home worth more than the 
balance of the current loan (set up with the support of banks, state and federal 
officials and a Federal Reserve Bank). 
 Simplify language in foreclosure notices. 
 Mandate notification of counseling options in foreclosure notices.
 Make mortgage loan crimes felonies. 
 Increase funding for homeowner counseling. 
 Stop mortgage rescue scams. 
 Ensure clear language on fees for “yield spread premiums.” 
 Brokers must act in “good faith” toward borrowers. 
 Establish a central repository of foreclosure information; require lenders to send 
a copy of the Foreclose Notice and details of any final foreclosure. 
 Require applicants for adjustable-rate mortgages to sign a form stating they don't 
want a fixed-rate mortgage. 
 Prosecute civil cases against those involved in predatory lending practices and 
foreclosure rescue scams. 
 Stabilize pilot programs targeted to at-risk neighborhoods. In partnership with 
lenders and nonprofits, reclaim pre-foreclosure and foreclosed properties in 
targeted communities for resale to qualified first-time homebuyers with the goal 
of returning property to fully-occupied status as quickly as possible. 
 Require lenders and brokers to have a "reasonable belief" (using available 
financial information) that the customer will be able to repay. 
Foreclosure to Homelessness: 
the Forgotten Victims of the Subprime Crisis 
National Coalition for the Homeless                                                                                                  Page 39 
 Bar lenders and brokers from profiting by charging higher interest rates than the 
borrower has qualified for. 
 Require mortgage lenders and brokers to consider a homebuyer's ability to repay 
an adjustable-rate loan at the higher adjusted rate. 
 Establish a duty for lenders to engage in "reasonable" loss mitigation upon 
default of a mortgage in order to provide an alternative to foreclosure. 
 Establish a "duty of good faith and fair dealing" for brokers, lenders and 
servicers.
 Establish a duty for lenders to ensure that the loan is sustainable for the life of 
loan.
 Ban kickbacks to mortgage brokers. 
 Bar mortgages that include financial penalties for early payment. 
 Eliminate penalties for borrowers who want to make early payments on subprime 
and nontraditional loans; limit penalties on prime loans. Extend the length of the 
foreclosure process to 150 days. 
 Reduce the requirement to publish foreclosure notices more than once (to cut 
foreclosure costs, and make saving the homes easier for homeowners). 
 Require deeds and other mortgage documents to include license numbers for the 
lenders and brokers involved in the loan. 
 Prohibit "any device, scheme or artifice to defraud."   
 Require servicers to pay incentives to mortgage counselors who find solutions 
that kept people in their homes. 
 Mandate staffing levels for servicers and dedicated caseworkers for each client 
so borrowers have a specific contact person. 
 Force lenders to provide six months' notice to homeowners with ARMs before the 
rate is reset. 
 Hold public awareness campaigns and borrower outreach events; when 
borrowers seek help early, there is a greater chance of success in avoiding 
foreclosure.
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INITIATIVES BY STATE 
New England 
Announced on 12/20/2007 – A fund of $125 million was committed by five New 
England banks to refinance subprime mortgages. The fund targets borrowers 
who are paying high rates despite good payment histories and are residing in 
homes that are worth more than their current loan - yet are finding their 
refinancing options limited because the mortgage company that wrote their initial 
loan is no longer operating. The initiative involves the support of state and federal 
officials and the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston. See 
www.MortgageReliefFund.com. 
California 
Defeated on 1/30/2008 – This was an “urgency” measure that required a 2/3 
vote to pass and would have gone into effect immediately. The bill may be 
reintroduced as a “regular” measure. If passed, it would have required lenders to:  
Give advance notice to borrowers of potential change in rates (four months’ 
notice before mortgage payment increases of 10 percent or more); Confer with 
borrowers in person or by telephone, about loan-restructuring options; Give 
property owners additional time to move from a foreclosed property; Write 
notices at a sixth-grade reading level; and Maintain foreclosed properties 
(potential fines of $1,000 a day). 
Other Bills Still under Consideration – Provisions to:  
– Ban kickbacks to mortgage brokers that were used to steer customers into pricier 
loans;
– Require lenders to determine the borrower’s ability to pay over the life of the 
loan;
– Prohibit negative amortization loans;  
– Require lenders and related businesses to make monthly reports on the types of 
loans they are servicing or making, including whether they are past due, in 
foreclosure, or modified to avoid a default (lenders say they want to avoid 
foreclosures and work out deals, but data on outcomes is lacking). 
Connecticut
Announced on 11/8/2007 – A $50 million project to enable borrowers to 
refinance their adjustable-rate mortgages into 30-year fixed rate loans. Limited to 
low and moderate income borrowers with subprime loans used to purchase their 
first home. A $50 million project administered by the Connecticut Housing 
Finance Authority (CHFA), the program is called the Connecticut Fair Alternative 
Mortgage Lending Initiative & Education Services Program ( CT FAMLIES ). The 
loans will be at 0.25% above CHFA's regular rate, which is typically below market 
rates.
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Maryland 
In Legislative Hearings –  A series of four bills, provisions to: Extend the length 
of the foreclosure process from 15 to nearly 150 days; Prevent investors from 
soliciting homes in foreclosure rescue schemes; Require personal notification of 
pending foreclosures; Reduce the requirement to published foreclosure notices 
from three times to only once (to cut foreclosure costs, and make saving the 
homes easier for homeowners); Require deeds and other mortgage documents 
to include license numbers for the lenders and brokers involved in the loan; 
Require loan servicing companies to file monthly reports: number of loans in 
default and to document efforts to help by refinancing or modifying the loan terms 
(to highlight the perceived gulf between what servicers say they are doing and 
the actual assistance); Ban prepayment penalties for subprime loans; Holding 
brokers, lenders and servicers to a "duty of good faith and fair dealing"; and 
Create a new criminal statute against mortgage fraud. 
Massachusetts 
June 2007 – Attorney General Martha Coakley adopted an emergency ban on 
rescue schemes, which entice homeowners facing foreclosure to sign over their 
property to a temporary purchaser, under the false hope it will help them keep 
the home over the long run. The ban is based upon her authority under the 
Massachusetts Consumer Protection Act, and does not apply to family members, 
nonprofit or community housing organizations who may try to help. In September, 
the emergency ban against for-profit foreclosure rescue transactions was made 
permanent.
Announced 7/11/2007 – A refinancing program for those with subprime 
mortgages and who are 60 or fewer days behind on their monthly payments. 
Refinance to 30-year loans at fixed rates of about 7.75 percent. Lenders would 
be “forced” to accept losses on loans where the value of the properties has 
dropped since the loans were made. [For example, consider a $250,000 
mortgage on a property now worth $230,000. To accept the refinancing, the 
lender would accept a $20,000 loss because MassHousing would offer only 
$230,000 to the subprime borrower.] Lenders in such situations may have no 
choice but to accept the state's offer because if they go to foreclosure, the 
property would be worth dramatically less. Borrowers who used subprime 
mortgages as a refinancing tool to cash out equity would not be eligible for the 
assistance. It will use $60 million in state housing bond funds and $190 million 
from the Fannie Mae mortgage company, which would be repaid through the new 
mortgages.
Regulations finalized by the Attorney General 10/17/2007 – Require lenders 
and brokers to treat all borrowers fairly, with the aim of eliminating excessive fees 
and loans that borrowers cannot afford. Lenders and brokers will be prohibited 
from arranging loans that they do not have a reasonable belief, given available 
information about the borrower's financial circumstances, the customer can 
repay. Lenders and brokers would be barred from profiting by charging higher 
interest rates than the borrower has qualified for. 
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Signed into law 11/30/2007 – Borrowers who fall behind are given a 90-day 
"Right to Cure" to catch up before lenders can act; Loan originators are under the 
supervision of, and need to be licensed by, the Massachusetts Division of Banks; 
Additional funding for first time homebuyer and foreclosure counseling; 
Prohibiting subprime adjustable rate mortgage for first time homebuyers unless 
they a) affirmatively opt-in, and b) get third-party in-person counseling from a 
certified counselor; Mortgage holder must report the foreclosure date and 
purchase price to the Division of Banks which will maintain a database. 
Announced 1/2/2008 – Massachusetts Division of Banks has joined six other 
state mortgage regulators to form the Nationwide Mortgage Licensing System 
(NMLS). The new system will increase and centralize information available to 
regulators, consumers and industry officials about the individuals and companies 
that originate and make home mortgages. 
Michigan
Announced 1/11/2008 – The Governor has met with representatives of the 
nation's leading mortgage servicers and received assurances, including: A 
willingness to freeze interest rates on Adjustable Rate Mortgages (ARMs) for up 
to five years in some cases (for people who are in their homes and making timely 
payments at their original interest rate); and proactively reaching out to borrowers 
in advance of rates being reset to work out alternatives to foreclosure 
Passed the House, now with the Senate – New refinancing options 
administered by the Michigan State Housing Development Authority (MSHDA) in 
conjunction with its “Save the Dream” information hotline. The proposal is to 
assist homeowners who have an ARM in refinancing to a lower-interest, fixed-
rate loan. In addition there is a proposed rescue refinance program that will 
assist individuals who have a delinquency on their mortgage and who are at risk 
of losing their home. Both programs would be financed through bond sales. 
Other legislation is sought that would regulate mortgage loan officers and bills 
that would prohibit predatory lending practices. 
New York 
In Effect 2/1/2007 – The Home Equity Theft Prevention Act targeting 
foreclosure-rescues scams will require contracts involving the sale of a home in 
default or foreclosure include more detailed disclosure about the transaction. The 
law applies to the owner of a one- to four-family home facing foreclosure or who 
is more than two months behind on mortgage payments. A home seller can 
cancel the contract within five business days. If a homeowner sells to an equity 
purchaser who will not use the house as a principal residence, the owner has two 
years to rescind the sale if the buyer has not fully complied with the law. 
Legislation in Work as of 2/7/2008 –  Provisions would require that delinquent 
borrowers be given a pre-foreclosure notice that would halt property seizures for 
“a period” while the borrowers work with lenders and credit counselors to 
negotiate new mortgage terms. It would create a legal requirement for mortgage 
brokers to act in the best interest of borrowers, making it illegal to steer 
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borrowers to subprime loans if they qualified for lower-cost credit. These 
provisions would also make it easier for defrauded borrowers to sue brokers. 
Other provisions: Clear disclosure of all hidden fees and potential interest-rate 
hikes; Early notice to borrowers who fall behind on their mortgages; Borrowers 
would be barred from getting a mortgage unless they can demonstrate an ability 
to repay it in a worst-case scenario. In addition the bill would define mortgage 
fraud and make it a crime. The bill is still being drafted, no target date has been 
announced. 
Assemblyman Proposal 1/14/2008 – A $150 million mortgage assistance fund 
for borrowers in owner-occupied homes who are in default: (a) Homeowners 
must be actively engaged with their lenders to develop arrangements or loan 
modifications; and (b) Lenders must contribute financially to any workout 
arrangement or loan modification.
Other provisions – Increasing the duties owed borrowers by lenders and 
brokers. The NYS Banking Department will monitor, study and report on the 
mortgage industry. This includes home loan origination reports from lenders. The 
provision establishes a duty for lenders to engage in "reasonable" loss mitigation 
upon default of a mortgage in order to provide an alternative to foreclosure. This 
establishes a duty for lenders to ensure that the loan is sustainable for the life of 
loan. Mortgagee to notify borrowers well in advance - 3 to 6 months - of an 
interest rate reset. Require that mortgagee notify mortgagor of default counseling 
and assistance when the mortgagor is in default in order to obtain standing to 
bring foreclosure action. 
Ohio
Implemented Program – A state task force recommended expanding the 
lending flexibilities of this previous program. In addition, from mid-December 
2007 through February, state-wide radio ads promoted the expanded program. 
The campaign starts by asking homeowners to look at their loan papers: is your 
mortgage a fixed-rate or an adjustable-rate loan (according to a survey, 34% do 
not know) and seek help if they think they're going to need it. The “Opportunity 
Loan Refinance” program offers consumers the chance to refinance at a fixed 
rate for 30 years. The program is for: low- and moderate-income consumers who 
live in the house, to refinance interest-only, high-rate or adjustable-rate 
mortgages before the loans adjust. Borrowers are eligible even if they have had 
one 60-day and two 30-day late payments during the past 12 months. 
Additional details: The program offers a 20-year, fixed-rate second mortgage to 
assist with closing costs (An amount up to five percent of the appraised value of 
the home. It may be used for fees associated with an existing mortgage, escrow 
payments, pre-payment penalties, late fees, attorney fees or other financing 
charges). A minimum of four hours of HUD-approved counseling is required. 
Homeowners who have received a foreclosure notice are not eligible. The 
agency has set aside $14 million for these loans, but has declined to state a 
maximum amount that could be offered in loans. 
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A compact drawn up by the Governor and State AG, Spring 2007 – (None of 
20 mortgage servicers and lenders targeted have agreed). The plan's provisions 
include: Notifying borrowers about resetting adjustable rate mortgages (ARMs) 
six months in advance; Servicers to pay incentives for mortgage counselors who 
find solutions that kept people in their homes; Mandated staffing levels and 
dedicated caseworkers for each client so borrowers always have a specific 
contact person. 
Proposed Rule Changes – Force lenders to provide six months' notice to 
homeowners with ARMs before the rate is reset. Require lenders to more 
adequately report to the state how many borrowers are going into foreclosure. To 
establish these changes, the Governor is considering a combination of: (a) 
Changing the rule-making authority of the Department of Commerce; (b) Using 
the Attorney General's authority to protect the rights of consumers through 
existing laws; and (c) Legislative approval.  
Oregon
Existing Law –  Oregon's mortgage lender law prohibits "any device, scheme or 
artifice to defraud." 
Proposed Bills – Provisions to: Eliminate penalties for borrowers who want to 
make early payments on subprime and nontraditional loans, and limit penalties 
on prime loans; Require creditors to verify that borrowers have enough income to 
cover mortgage payments; Limit incentives and improve disclosures for 
incentives that lenders pay to brokers for selling a higher rate loan (yield spread 
premiums); Creates a fiduciary duty for mortgage brokers; Bar foreclosure rescue 
businesses from acquiring people’s property in the transactions; Grant customers 
the right to cancel a deal within three days; Limits fees a company may charge to 
distressed homeowners; and gives regulators wide ranging powers to clean up 
questionable lending practices. 
Washington
Passed the legislature on 1/30/2008 – Provides emergency money to increase 
homeowner counseling in the state. Other bills, still in the legislature, include: A 
requirement for simple language in foreclosure notices; Mandating notification of 
counseling options in foreclosure notices; Making mortgage loan crimes felonies; 
Mandating clear language on the fees for “yield spread premiums”; Requiring 
brokers to act in good faith toward borrowers; and Stopping mortgage rescue 
scams.
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Appendix 6: NCH letter to the Federal Reserve
National Coalition for the Homeless 
2201 P St. NW 
Washington, DC 20037-1033  Email: info@nationalhomeless.org 
 Phone: (202) 462-4822  Fax: (202) 462-4823 Web page: www.nationalhomeless.org 
 
Bringing America Home 
Board of Directors 
Bob Erlenbusch, President 
L.A. Coalition to End Hunger & 
Homelessness
John Parvensky, Vice President 
Colorado Coalition for the Homeless 
Barbara Anderson, Secretary 
Indiana Coalition for the Homeless 
Phillip Pappas, Treasurer 
Community Human Services 
Anita Beaty, Executive Committee 
Metro Atlanta Task Force for the 
Homeless
Michael Chesser, Executive Committee 
Upstate Homeless Coalition of S. 
Carolina
Brian Davis, Executive Committee 
Northeast Ohio Coalition for the 
Homeless
Sue Watlov Phillips, Executive 
Committee 
Elim Transitional Housing, Inc. 
Richard Troxell, Executive Committee 
House the Homeless, Inc. 
Ed Bell 
Dteroit, MI 
Osvaldo Burgos-Perez, Esq. 
San Juan, Puerto Rico 
Michael Dahl 
Minnesota Coalition for the Homeless 
Sherrie Downing 
Montana Council on Homelessness 
Bill Duncan 
Homewood Suite, by Hilton 
Hugh Grogan 
Sioux Empire Homeless Coalition 
Rey Lopez 
The King’s Outreach 
Phoebe Nelson 
Women’s Resource Center of N. Central 
WA 
Glorin Ruiz Pastush 
La Fondita de Jesus 
David Pirtle 
Until We’re Home, Inc. 
Diana Robledo 
Primavera Foundation 
Greg Sileo 
Baltimore Homeless Services 
Sandy Swank 
Inter-Faith Ministries 
Mike Wallace 
National League of Cities 
Dana Woolfolk 
Washington, DC 
John Zirker 
Nashville Homeless Power Project 
Gordon Packard, Honorary Member  
Primavera Foundation 
Louisa Stark, Honorary Member 
Phoenix Consortium for the Homeless 
Matias J. Vega, MD, Honorary Member 
Albuquerque Health Care for the 
Homeless
March 29, 2008 
Linwood Gill III, Vice President 
Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond 
701 East Byrd Street 
P.O. Box 27622 
Richmond, VA 23261 
RE: Bank of America’s proposed acquisition of Countrywide Financial 
Dear Mr. Gill, 
The National Coalition For The Homeless is opposed to Bank of America’s 
proposed acquisition of Countrywide Financial unless the following conditions 
outlined below are met. 
At least one million borrowers who have obtained subprime and adjustable rate 
home mortgages from either Countrywide or one of its subsidiaries are either in 
foreclosure or behind on their payments. This merger could have a dramatic 
impact on the increase of homelessness nationwide due to foreclosure on 
home and rental investment properties.
In a preliminary survey of communities across the nation, the National Coalition 
For The Homeless has identified a significant increase in homelessness 
attributable directly to foreclosures. Specifically, over 60% of the communities 
responding to this national survey indicated that they had seen an increase in 
homelessness due to the "subprime meltdown."  We will be releasing this 
preliminary report in the next 30 days and we will be sure that you receive a copy 
of this important report. 
The Federal Reserve should not allow Bank of America to continue to grow 
unless there is a firm written requirement to serve its present and future customers 
by implementing the following for the benefit of endangered homeowners and 
rental investment properties with tenants who are at or below 30% of median 
income. 
1. Initiate an immediate foreclosure moratorium on all mortgage loans in 
Bank of America’s and Countrywide’s portfolio, including those that are 
currently being serviced or have been purchased back through a Sheriff’s 
sale process.
2. Modify loan for borrowers in danger of losing their homes or are in the 
redemption process after Sheriff’s sale to a fixed rate of no more than 6% 
for 30 years.
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Bringing America Home 
3. Immediately, provide non profits in their communities, the opportunity to act in a receivership 
role and/or lease the property for $1/year to assist homeowners and rental investment property 
owners in foreclosure or have had a sheriff’s sale, to assist the owner to develop a refinancing 
plan at 6% or below for 30 years and to allow present residents to stay in their homes, while 
continuing to pay rent or Contract for Deed on the property.
4. Pay Non profits a management fee and provide Bank of America underwriter’s and loan 
officer’s staff time to re-negotiate the loans. 
5. Allow communities and non profits to purchase the property at a reasonable below market 
price, lease property for $1/year, or donate the property to non profits to maintain the 
affordability of housing in their communities. This would assist present homeowners and 
residents to remain in their homes and will allow utilization of presently vacant homes as 
affordable home ownership and rental units for people at or below 30% of median income. 
This strategy may include the use of land trusts.
6.  Bank of America filed their application to acquire Countrywide on February 19, 2008. The 
notice in the Federal Reserve web site was not posted until February 29, 2008. Even though a 
30 day period for comments is being offered based on the day filing was posted on the web 
site, the National Coalition For The Homeless still contends that the comment period should be 
extended. Because of the subprime crisis, the Bank of America/Countrywide Merger is unique. 
Without access to the Home Mortgage and Disclosure Act (HMDA) data for 2007, assessing 
the impact of the merger would be incomplete. As of March 1, 2008, lenders were required to 
supply HMDA data to anyone who requests it. The comment period should be extended thirty 
days past the date that Bank of America and Countrywide provide their HMDA data to the 
public.
Due to the potentially millions of individuals and families at risk of becoming homeless due to 
foreclosures and foreclosures disproportionately impacting people of color and low-income 
communities,  the National Coalition For The Homeless is requesting that the above conditions be 
met and additional public comment period be provided prior to the approval of any merger. 
Sincerely,
Sue Watlov Phillips, M.A., C.S.P. 
Past President of National Coalition for the Homeless 
Executive Committee and Board Member
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Appendix 7:   April 10, 2008 testimony to the Financial Services Committee 
of the House of Representatives by Sheila Crowley, President of the 
National Low Income Housing Coalition  
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Testimony of Sheila Crowley, MSW, Ph.D. 
President of the National Low Income Housing Coalition 
presented to the 
Financial Services Committee 
United States House of Representatives 
April 10, 2008
Chairman Frank, Ranking Member Bachus, and Members of the Committee, thank you 
for the opportunity to testify today on the proposed FHA Housing Stabilization and 
Homeownership Retention Act, specifically on Title III: Loans and Grants to States for 
Foreclosure Relief/Mitigation. 
I am Sheila Crowley, President of the National Low Income Housing Coalition; our 
members include non-profit housing providers, homeless service providers, fair housing 
organizations, state and local housing coalitions, public housing agencies, private developers and 
property owners, housing researchers, local and state government agencies, faith-based 
organizations, residents of public and assisted housing and their organizations, and concerned 
citizens. The National Low Income Housing Coalition does not represent any sector of the 
housing industry. Rather, NLIHC works only on behalf of and with low income people who need 
safe, decent, and affordable housing, especially those with the most serious housing problems.
NLIHC is entirely funded with private donations. 
Who is Affected by Foreclosure? 
The major concerns of the National Low Income Housing Coalition in the foreclosure 
crisis are with the fate of low income people and renters. The lower a household’s income, the 
less able it is to cope in the face of foreclosure. Renters who have the misfortune of having 
landlords who lose their property to foreclosure are the completely blameless victims of this 
catastrophe. Low income renters who live in properties subject to foreclosure are in real trouble, 
lacking the resources to easily relocate. 
 Unfortunately the data on both form of tenure and income of families affected by 
foreclosure are not collected in any form that makes examination easy. But we do have some 
indicators. For example: 
 An analysis by NLIHC of bank owned/REO transactions and foreclosure auctions in 
Massachusetts from January 1, 2007 to March 19, 2008 shows 8,398 foreclosed 
residential properties with an estimated 13,119 housing units. One-family houses and 
condo units accounted for just 43% of the units.  
 The same analysis of Connecticut bank owned/REO transactions during the same period 
shows 1,532 foreclosed residential properties with an estimated 2,305 housing units. One-
family and condo units accounted for 44% of the units. 
 The Rhode Island Housing Finance Agency reports that 51% of the foreclosures initiated 
in Providence in February 2008 are of two to five family properties.    
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 The Hennepin County (MN) Taxpayer Service reports that 38% of foreclosures in 2006 
involved rental property; the figure was 56% for the City of Minneapolis 
 CBS News reported on March 27, 2008 that based on Realty-Trac data, “38 percent of 
foreclosures now involve rental properties,” affecting “at least 168,000 households 
nationwide.”
NLIHC also has gleaned income data from housing counseling agency program reports. 
The attached chart shows income data of clients seeking foreclosure related counseling. The 
range of percent of clients with incomes at 50% area median income (AMI) or less is 18% to 
88%, with a median of 47%. The range of percent of clients of incomes at 30% AMI or less is 
3% to 40% with median of 22%. 
 Though hardly comprehensive, these data support the numerous news reports that renters 
are a significant portion of families who are losing their homes due to foreclosure. A working 
estimate is 40%. The data also support the anecdotal reports from local service providers that 
very low (50% AMI or less) and extremely low (30% AMI or less) income families are a 
significant portion of those who are losing their homes due to foreclosure. A working estimate 
for very low income families is 50% and 20% for extremely low income families. 
Policy Implications 
Renter Protection. There is considerable variation from state to state on the rights of 
tenants when the owners of their homes lose their property to foreclosure. Some states have 
enacted tenant protection laws that give the tenants a reasonable period of time to relocate. 
Others have very draconian rules. I received a report of two Alaskan families who had become 
homeless after losing the homes they rented due to foreclosure with just seven days notice.
Although renter protection language was included in H.R. 3915 that has passed the 
House, this provision would only be applicable if the mortgage on the rented property was 
entered into after enactment.  Current tenants should be protected as well. Please include such 
language in the bill under development.  
We recommend that for every foreclosure begun after the date of enactment of this 
legislation, if the current occupant is renting the property, the entity that takes ownership of the 
property must honor the lease of the current leaseholder or allow the leaseholder to continue to 
occupy the property for at least six months, whichever is longer. State laws that provide greater 
protection should not be pre-empted. The provision should apply to single family as well as 
multi-family property owners. This provision should continue to apply when the property is 
resold to a new owner, unless it is a single family home that the new purchaser intends to occupy 
as his or her primary residence. 
Emergency Assistance. The dominant discussion on assisting households at risk of 
foreclosure centers around helping them negotiate work-out arrangements with their lenders or 
refinance their homes with FHA insurance. These are important, but insufficient, actions. Lower 
income families faced with eviction either because they were foreclosed upon or their rented 
home was subject to foreclosure often lack the resources to transition to a new living 
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arrangement.  For example, they may not have the immediate funds to pay moving expenses or 
required security and utility deposits.  
To prevent people from actually becoming homeless, we recommend a one-time 
supplemental appropriation of $300 million to the Emergency Food and Shelter Program. The 
purpose is to provide direct financial assistance to be used solely for housing-related assistance 
needed to prevent homelessness in connection with the foreclosure on a dwelling occupied by an 
eligible family. This assistance will include relocation expenses, security and utility deposits, 
mortgage payments, rent payments, utility payments, and other foreclosure or eviction 
prevention expenses. An eligible family is one who owns or rents a dwelling subject to 
foreclosure or a unit in a dwelling subject to foreclosure, is legally responsible for the rent or 
mortgage payment on that dwelling, and does not have the financial resources to avoid becoming 
homeless if the dwelling they occupy is foreclosed upon. 
The Emergency Food and Shelter Program was established in 1983 as a program at 
FEMA, but is run by the United Way of America and governed by a National Board composed 
of representatives of major charities, including Catholic Charities USA, United Jewish 
Communities, the Salvation Army, and the United Way. The National Board distributes funds to 
2,500 local boards that in turn make grants to 11,000 community based non-profits and faith-
based organizations to provide assistance to needy families. The program is highly regarded as 
an efficient service delivery system. The United Way reports increased demand for EFSP 
assistance due to foreclosure.  
Preventing homelessness due to foreclosure should be a top public policy priority. 
Homelessness is highly traumatic for the families who experience it and much more costly than 
the modest amount of assistance needed to prevent it. Our proposal for $300 million will provide 
$3,000 in assistance for 100,000 families. It would seem to be the least we can do. 
  I am aware that as a FEMA program, the Emergency Food and Shelter Program is not 
under the jurisdiction of the Financial Services Committee. We are working with the Homeland 
Security Committee for consideration of this proposal and request the endorsement of the 
Financial Services Committee. 
Changes to Title III: Loans and Grants to States for Foreclosure Relief/Mitigation.
We have previously submitted a letter to Chairman Frank with several recommendations to 
strengthen the proposed loans and grants to states. Giving states the ability to buy foreclosed 
homes and put them back into service makes good sense. However, the program should be 
designed to also address the most pervasive and long-standing housing problem of every 
community, that is, the shortage of affordable rental housing. 
This shortage is well-documented. Just this week, NLIHC released the latest edition of 
our widely cited report Out of Reach. The primary measure of housing unaffordability reported 
in Out of Reach is the Housing Wage, that is, the hourly wage that one must earn working full 
time in order to afford to rent a modest home. The Housing Wage this year for Boston is $26.02, 
an increase of 41% since 2000. In Birmingham, the Housing Wage is $13.27, 36% higher than it 
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was in 2000. The figure for Los Angeles is $25.00, up 62% since 2000; for Martinsburg, WV, it 
is $13.10, up 39% since 2000.1
Nationwide, there are just 38 rental homes that are available and affordable for every 100 
extremely low income families. The comparable figure for Massachusetts is 51 homes; for 
Alabama, it is 56. In California, it is just 23 units, and in West Virginia, it is 51.2
The competition for affordable rental homes is intensifying as families who have lost 
their homes to foreclosure flood the rental housing market. One critical intervention needed by 
the Federal government is to expand the supply of affordable rental housing, reducing the 
number of people at the bottom of the wage and income ladder who will be squeezed out of the 
housing market altogether. 
Therefore, first and foremost, we recommend that at least 25% of the proposed $10 
billion in grants and loans be for the benefit of extremely low income households and agree 
strongly with Ms. Waters’s proposal to do so in H.R. 5678.  The preference for grants and loans 
to support housing for the lowest income families for the longest period of affordability provided 
in Mr. Frank’s proposed bill is an important measure. But in the absence of specific requirements 
for deep income targeting, there is no guarantee that any of these funds will be used to create 
more housing options for those with the fewest choices. Also, new owners who rent out their 
properties should be required to accept Section 8 housing vouchers.  
We also urge that the use of these grants and loans minimally not result in a net loss of 
rental units in any jurisdiction that receives this assistance. An existing tenant who is occupying 
a foreclosed property should be able to continue to do so if he or she so desires, unless the new 
owner will use the property as a primary residence. Relocation related expenses, including the 
payment of security deposits, should be provided for lower income tenants who choose to or 
must move.  
Another recommendation to improve the draft legislation is to remove the requirements 
that properties eligible for purchase with grants or loans be “predominately vacant” in the case of 
multifamily housing and “vacant” in the case of single family homes. These vacancy 
requirements for eligible properties will encourage the eviction of innocent tenants in order for 
the property to eligible for purchase through this program. Displacement of renters should be 
avoided at all costs as they offer stability to the neighborhoods in which they live. Forcing them 
out will serve to destabilize neighborhoods, contradicting the basic objective of the legislation. 
 Additional recommendations include: 
 The program should be administered by HUD and HUD standards for rent reasonableness 
and housing quality standards (or local building codes, whichever is more stringent) 
should apply. 
 The formula for distribution of the funds to states should: 
                                                          
1 Wardrip, K. E.; Pelletiere, D; and Crowley, S. (2008) Out of reach 2007-2008: the wait for a home grows longer.
Washington, D.C. National Low Income Housing Coalition. 
2 Pelletiere, D. and Wardrip, K. E. (2008) Housing at the half: A mid-decade progress report from the 2005 
American Community Survey. Washington, D.C.: National Low Income Housing Coalition.   
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a. Explicitly include median multifamily home prices. 
b. Explicitly include the number of units represented by each foreclosure, instead of 
the number of foreclosures on “homes.” 
c. Use data from a longer period of time, perhaps the most recent eight quarters, 
versus the most recent two quarters, for purposes of allocating appropriated 
amounts.   
 Eligible entities to receive funds should include public housing authorities, non-profits, 
and for profit companies. 
 Accountability should be strengthened by including specific reporting requirements about 
the number and income of families served, specific uses of the grants funds, status of 
loans and activities funded by the loans, identification of all recipients of grants and 
loans, and the degree to which the program has affirmatively furthered fair housing.  
These reports should be made publically available. 
Finally, careful attention should be paid to the right pricing of any homes to be purchased 
and resold. A new analysis by NLIHC and the Center for Economic and Policy Research shows 
that in many metropolitan areas where housing costs have been greatly inflated, the cost of home 
ownership far exceeds the financial benefits. For example, in Boston, the monthly cost for a 30 
year mortgage at 7% interest for a house selling at 75% of the median house price is $2,340. The 
Fair Market Rent for a two bedroom home is $1,084 a month. We do not know how far the 
market will fall or where the bottom is. In still inflated markets, new owners will not accrue 
equity to justify expending over twice the monthly housing cost differential between home 
ownership and renting.3 We urge caution in using public funds to subsidize homeownership at 
prices that have not yet hit bottom.  
A Plea for Balance 
There is plenty of blame to go around for the U.S. mortgage foreclosure crisis that is 
causing international economic turmoil.  Included among the contributors to the crisis must be 
those thought purveyors and policy makers who have uncritically promoted home ownership as 
the idealized form of housing tenure in the United States and the path to the middle class for low 
income people. The rhetoric on home ownership in America equating it with worthiness and 
patriotism, in a political era that favored an under- or unregulated market, created a fertile 
environment for risky and unscrupulous lending practices to flourish, while people who should 
have known better colluded or looked the other way.
A social environment saturated with messages that have propelled low income people to 
seek home ownership at all costs has also delivered the corollary message that rental housing is 
inferior. And if rental housing is inferior, rental housing affordable for low income people is 
downright undesirable. We need look no further than the diminished federal investment in low 
income housing programs for evidence of the neglect of the rental housing sector.  The virulent 
protests that erupt in communities across the country when proposals to build more low income 
                                                          
3 Baker, D.; Pelletiere, D. and Rho, H.J. (2008) The cost of maintaining ownership in the current crisis: 
Comparisons in 20 cities.  Washington, D.C.: National Low Income Housing Coalition and Center for Economic 
and Policy Research.
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rental housing become public also demonstrate the degree to which rental housing is rejected as a 
necessary housing choice in a healthy community.
 The interventions that you devise for this immediate crisis should not be for the purpose 
of restoring the status quo. The U.S. housing market is in desperate need of rebalancing. 
Purchase prices need to make financial sense. Costs and incomes need to be more in sync. 
Homes need to be more reasonably sized and better for the environment. Communities need to 
make sure that their housing stock matches the needs of the people who live there. Tax policy 
needs to reward moderation, not excess. Most of all, housing needs to be understood much more 
as the place where one is sheltered and carries out family life, and much less as a financial asset 
and a source of wealth building. I urge you to use this galvanizing moment that has the potential 
of producing significant policy changes at considerable cost to the Federal Treasury to lead the 
way to more balanced housing policy and a more balanced housing market. 
             Thank you for consideration of my remarks. 
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The Impact of Foreclosures on Homelessness: a Survey by the NCH
1. Default Section
1. Please tell us about yourself.
2. Name of community this information is being provided for
3. Please estimate the number of homes (owned and rental units) in foreclosure as a 
result of the subprime mortgage crisis in your community.
4. Has homelessness increased in your community as a result of these foreclosures? 
5. If yes, please estimate the number of people and/or famlies who have become 
homeless as a result.
The National Coalition for the Homeless [NCH] is deeply concerned about the subprime and foreclosure crisis and its potential to 
increase homelessness in our communities. Please take a moment to participate in this national survey of homeless service 
providers, advocates and coalitions. Your input is critical because our collective perspective may not otherwise be included in the 
national dialogue on this issue. Your response will help NCH raise the level of awareness among our policy makers about the 
interdependence between the subprime/foreclosure crisis and the changing face of homelessness in our nation.
*
Name:
Agency:
Job Title:
Address:
City/Town:
State:
ZIP/Postal Code:
E-mail:
Phone Number:
Homes previously 
inhabited by owner
Rental units
Yes
No
I don't know
nmlkj
nmlkj
nmlkj
Number of individuals
Number of families
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The Impact of Foreclosures on Homelessness: a Survey by the NCH
6. How do you know that homelessness has increased as a result of the subprime 
mortgage/foreclosure crisis in your community?
7. If you are seeing an increased number of evictions as a result of subprime 
mortgage failures, where are people currently staying?
8. Is your local housing coalition... 
9. Is there anything else you want us to know?
10. Would you like the National Coalition for the Homeless to provide you a copy of 
the report created from this information? 
11. How would you like the NCH to contact you?
Other (please specify)
 Yes
Government report gfedc
Local media gfedc
National media gfedc
Emergency shelter reports gfedc
Anecdotal reports from 
clients
gfedc
Other (please specify)
 Yes
Emergency shelters gfedc
Transitional shelters gfedc
With family or friends gfedc
On the streets gfedc
In a home they rent gfedc
I don't know gfedc
 Yes No I don't know
...working to prevent 
foreclosures and 
evictions?
nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj
...addressing the issues 
of potential 
homelessness in their 
work on foreclosures or 
evictions?
nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj
Yesnmlkj Nonmlkj
Telephonenmlkj E-mailnmlkj Postal servicenmlkj
Thank you for taking the time to participate in this survey! 
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ABOUT THE NATIONAL COALITION FOR THE HOMELESS 
The National Coalition for the Homeless, founded in 1982, is a national network of 
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Washington, DC 20037 | Phone: 202.462.4822 | Fax: 202.462.4823 
Website: www.nationalhomeless.org | E-mail: info@nationalhomeless.org
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www.nationalhomeless.org
Former suburban  home owners  now dwelling in a tent city erected in 
suburban Ontario, just outside Los Angeles, California. 
